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Abstract. In this article, I will deal with the role of pictures within discus-
sions on the crisis of contemporary philosophical hermeneutics. Firstly, I
will argue that some of the aporias this debate runs up against can be over-
come by a reconsideration of the traditional dualism of word and image.
In this regard my reference point is Paul Ricoeur’s theory of metaphor.
His model of the living metaphor overcomes the diﬃculties posed by the
hermeneutics of the symbol and restores the image to an internal force
within language: image seeks language to give itself form, and language
seeks image to feed on new meanings. Secondly, I will reconstruct some
aspects of the interdisciplinary debate around the so-called ‘pictorial turn’,
in which, I will argue, very interesting features can be identiﬁed that Ri-
coeur’s theory of metaphor merely foreshadows. In this reactivation of the
role of pictures, the debate concerning the outcomes of twentieth-century
hermeneutics can probably make new claims on our attention.
In Picture Theory, one of the seminal texts on the pictorial turn in contempo-
rary philosophy, W.J.T. Mitchell proposes a deﬁnition of the relationship
between text and image that has met with a certain success in the debate
around Visual Culture. Mitchell aims to identify the picture as the subject
that various disciplinary traditions – from philosophy to semiotics, from
the arts to media studies – end up converging upon nowadays. He explains
that if there is one thing that these disciplines tell us incontrovertibly,
it is the impossibility of considering the visual as a ‘pure’ ﬁeld of repre-
sentation, that stands in extrinsic relation to the verbal: “The interaction
of pictures and texts is constitutive of representation as such” (Mitchell,
1994, p. 5).
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Picture  Theory provides this interaction with a theoretic framework
based on a tripartite model. The two terms can be considered (1) in the
form of the imagetext, that is of “composite, synthetic works (concepts)
that combine image and text”; (2) they can be brought back to the model of
the image/text, to highlight the existence of “a problematic gap” or a “cleav-
age” between the two media, thus accentuating a sort of “rupture” in the
ﬁeld of representation; or (3) one can emphasize the possibility of “rela-
tions of the visual and the verbal”, and for this purpose Mitchell turns to
the category of image-text (Mitchell, 1994, p. 89, my emphasis).
Although this is a hypothesis that poses several problems with regard
to its cross-disciplinary applicability, it has at least one obvious merit:
it sums up in speciﬁc terms the discussion concerning the fortunes and
shortcomings of the linguistic turn during the twentieth century. The
aim of this article is to make use of Mitchell’s categories, in particular
that of imagetext, to reﬂect on a part of that debate. For this purpose, I
will consider the relation between the verbal and the visual according to
two diﬀerent ﬁgures, both dependent on the Kantian metaphor of the
Copernican revolution. To express this hypothesis in a preliminary way, it
consists above all in the idea that twentieth-century philosophical herme-
neutics represents a sort of ‘second Copernican revolution’: a revolution
in which the aesthetic background of thinking comes to the fore and be-
comes unavoidable. In taking this line I will follow above all indications
from Paul Ricoeur and some of his interpreters. In the second part of
my article, I will suggest that the limits of such a response, highlighted by
the so-called pictorial turn, preﬁgure the possibility of a ‘third Copernican
revolution’, in which prevail not simply extra-descriptive languages – as in
Ricoeur’s case – but sense constructions based on the picture and on its
(extra-)textuality.
1. Hermeneutics as a Second Copernican Revolution
The  hypothesis  that  philosophical  hermeneutics  represented, in  the
course of the twentieth century, a sort of second Copernican revolution
can be argued in many ways. It is worthwhile recalling the signiﬁcance
assumed by this connotation at the hands of one of hermeneutics’ key ﬁg-
ures, Paul Ricoeur.
303
Proceedings of the European Society for Aesthetics, vol. 5, 2013
Alberto Martinengo From the Linguistic Turn to the Pictorial Turn
The point of entry to the question is represented by what has justly
been deﬁned as Ricoeur’s phenomenological heresy (Aime, 2007, p. 52). By
this expression, as is well known, is meant the progressive distancing of
his thought from Edmund Husserl’s premises. It is a reconsideration cul-
minating in the idea that the thematization of subjectivity cannot make
use of the Husserlian method of the description of essences, but must “in-
troduce into the circle of reﬂection the long detour by way of the symbols
and myths transmitted by the great cultures” (Ricoeur, 1995, p. 16)1. This is
a crucial decision for Ricoeur’s hermeneutics, such that from it derives the
fundamental formula accompanying his departure from the phenomeno-
logical tradition, and which is summed up in the motto “The symbol gives
rise to thought” (Ricoeur, 1969, p. 347)2.
The fortune of this statement is well known and has been dissected
in every possible way by commentators. But to appreciate fully its conse-
quences it is useful to take a step backwards and discuss its singular geneal-
ogy. In fact this formula contains a clear Kantian connotation, that the in-
terpreters themselves have sometimes overlooked (cf. Amherdt, 2004, pp.
72-73, fn. 40). The reference, that touches very closely upon what Ricoeur
wants to express, is to what the third Critique says about aesthetic ideas.
Let me recall a passage of §49 of the Critique of the Power of Judgment (‘On
the Faculties of the Mind that Constitute Genius’): speaking of the spirit
in an aesthetic signiﬁcance (Geist in ästhetischer Bedeutung), Kant deﬁnes it as
“the faculty for the presentation of aesthetic ideas”, an aesthetic idea being
“that representation of the imagination that occasions much thinking [die
viel zu denken veranlaßt] though without it being possible for any deter-
minate thought, i.e., concept, to be adequate to it, which, consequently,
no language fully attains or can make intelligible” (Kant, 2000, p. 192).
It will be Ricoeur himself, in Freud and Philosophy, to allude openly to
the notion of aesthetic idea3. However the Kantian tone of the pages of
1 The critical literature on Ricoeur’s ‘long detour’ is vast. The main reference is un-
doubtedly Greisch, 2001, chap. III.
2 On the fortune of this formula, cf. François Dosse’s fundamental reconstruction:
Dosse, 2001, pp. 312-317. It is useful, however, to recall also the map drawn by Amherdt,
2004, pp. 41ﬀ., who takes account in particular of the theological reception of the topic.
3 Ricoeur represents the reference to Kant in the following terms: “Symbols give rise
to thought, I said [in The Symbolism of Evil], using a phrase from Kant’s Critique of Judg-
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The Symbolism of Evil dedicated to the motto “The symbol gives rise to
thought” goes well beyond this reference. It is here, in fact, that Ricoeur
makes explicit the possibility of considering the hermeneutics of the sym-
bol in terms of a second Copernican revolution (Ricoeur, 1969, p. 356)4.
Let us try to understand what this means for Ricoeur. To aﬃrm that
“the symbol gives rise to thought” means recognizing that it represents a
hint towards something other – this is the case, for example, of the role
of the symbol in the complex symptomatology articulated by psycoanaly-
sis. From Ricoeur’s perspective, such otherness represents the residue and
the insuperable symptom of the fact that there is something that precedes
consciousness and that never allows itself to be exhausted in the exercise of
thinking. Thence, the strongest reason for the heresy – or at this point,
the schism – with regard to phenomenology. A reason, however, that Ri-
coeur articulates from an ontological standpoint: to choose a hermeneuti-
cal approach to the problem of symbolic language implies in fact that one
considers the symbol “as an index of the situation of man at the heart of
the being in which he moves, exists, and wills” (Ricoeur, 1969, p. 356). Or,
in still more explicit terms, it means aﬃrming that “the symbol gives rea-
son to think that the Cogito is within being and not vice versa” (Ricoeur,
1969, p. 356).
Expressed in these terms, the Kantian origin of Ricoeur’s hermeneutic
turn is of great interest in clarifying issues of relevance to his abandonment
of phenomenology. Some commentators (cf. Tengelyi, 1998) radicalize the
Kantian inﬂuence further, suggesting a decisive connection to the notion
of the thing in itself and, with reference to the pre-critical writings, to the
discussion on the a priori proof of God’s existence. To read the theme of
the symbol from this angle means tracing Ricoeur’s hermeneutic turning
point to a speciﬁc idea: the work of the concept (in Kant: the application
of the categories) cannot occur in the absence of presuppositions, that is
without something that precedes the concept itself. Which represents a
ment. Symbols give, they are the gift of language; but this gift creates for me the duty to
think, to inaugurate philosophic discourse, starting from what is always prior to and the
foundation of that discourse” (Ricoeur, 1970, p. 38).
4 The need for a repetition of the Copernican revolution already occurs in Ricoeur,
1952, p. 140. For the ﬂuctuations that this formula undergoes in the course of Ricoeur’s
thinking, cf. Kenzo, 2009, pp. 100-103 (particularly fn. 24).
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fair approximation of Ricoeur’s own theoretical intentions: if something
precedes the concept, it declares itself precisely in the symbols that the
culture deposits in the subject (Tengelyi, 1998, pp. 118-121).
From a historical perspective, these connections outline a scenario that
is not without ambiguity and would be thus worthy of careful evaluation.
But the most relevant factor, at least for the development of Ricoeur’s
thought, rests in the fact that the Copernican reference must not be un-
derstood as a counter-revolution with respect to Kantian transcendental-
ism. The correct interpretation is more subtle, because his real critical
target is the Husserl of phenomenological reduction. Better, the claim for
a second Copernicanism amounts to the choice to use Kant against Husserl. In
other words, it is as though Ricoeur were to say that the transcendental
turn is without doubt a point of no return for modern philosophy, but that
the outcome which Husserl’s Ideen purported to derive from it should be
seriously questioned. Hence the reason for Ricoeur’s heresy5.
2. A Third Copernican Revolution?
2.1. Symbol and Metaphor
For Ricoeur, the reference to the second Copernican revolution has then
a clear signiﬁcance, that of highlighting the existence of ‘symbolic para-
digms’ that determine the very possibility of reﬂection. From his perspec-
tive, this heteronomy of reﬂection – which is the real common trait of
twentieth-century philosophical hermeneutics – assumes however a spe-
ciﬁc declension, which is determined precisely by the reference to the
5 Here Ricoeur has the merit of formulizing the real stakes that underlie the history
of the phenomenological movement after Husserl’s Ideen. The key issue is again that of
the presupposition, or rather the lack of the presuppositions, that should constitute the
methodological premise of the exercise of reﬂection. To proceed in this direction would
in fact mean remaining within “the enchanted enclosure of consciousness of oneself” (Ri-
coeur, 1969, p. 356). On the contrary, the attention to symbolic language is of a piece
with the critique of the self-positing of the subject: it is in brief “an essential step in the
constitution of a decentered self ” (Kenzo, 2009, p. 104), where the sense of decentering
stands precisely in the recognition that one gains access to subjectivity only by means of
the long detour by way of symbols. Cf. also Tengelyi, 1998, pp. 132-133, including refer-
ences not only to Ricoeur, but also to Maurice Merleau-Ponty and to Martin Heidegger.
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Kantian notion of aesthetic idea. Let me compare §49 of the Critique of the
Power of Judgment with the hermeneutic motto on symbolism: for Ricoeur,
the symbol is really “that representation of the imagination that occasions
much thinking” – or that gives rise to thought, according to the translation
that he would have preferred –, in other words that representation “which,
consequently, no language fully attains or can make intelligible” (Kant,
2000, p. 192). The symbolic paradigm of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics is tout
court an ‘aesthetic paradigm’, at least in the Kantian sense of the term: it is
a background of thinking, a horizon of meanings not immediately subject
to logic, from which the concept draws its own resources.
If this is an undoubted acquisition for Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of the
symbol, things change when he extends the discourse to the issue of meta-
phor. It is a shift that might seem of little import, and in fact Ricoeur tries
to conceive it as a mere generalization of his discussion on the symbol and
its polysemy. However this attempt is destined to fail, and for reasons
which have to do precisely with the speciﬁc diﬀerence between the per-
formances of metaphoric and symbolic language. The central point of the
matter is soon stated. Metaphor is not only an instrument of linguistic in-
novation, which is also true, in a broad sense, of symbolic language. Before
that, it works as a device for visualization, for the construction of images by
means of words – and only in this way is metaphor able in its turn to pro-
duce new meanings.
The central place that this connotation occupies is the most evi-
dent feature of Ricoeur’s Aristotelianism. In the well-known passage of
the Poetics, that speaks of the qualities of the poet skilled in producing
apt metaphors, Aristotle explains that skill in metaphor “cannot be ac-
quired from another, and is a sign of natural gifts: because to use metaphor
well is to discern similarities” (Poetics, 1459a 5-8). He says as much in the
Rhetoric, though no longer with regard to the poet but to language itself:
metaphor is a device which is able to “bring-before-the-eyes” the relations
that speech sets up, for example those between the inanimate and the an-
imate, between the abstract and the concrete (On Rhetoric, 1410b 33).
Although we are dealing with an entirely traditional deﬁnition, here
we are before a fundamental shift in Ricoeur’s analysis, that must be given
due emphasis. It is in fact entirely evident that the Kantian paradigm of
aesthetic idea is by no means applicable to metaphor: precisely by virtue
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of the Aristotelian background in which it is placed, Ricoeur’s metaphor
is not at all a representation of the imagination which ‘no language fully attains
or can make intelligible’. To put it bluntly: constructing good metaphors
means exactly the opposite, it means using certain linguistic performances
to generate an increase in the legibility (or, rather, in the visibility) of the
real.
The metaphor and the symbol, then, represent two radically diﬀerent
ways of relating the visual and the verbal. To deﬁne the connection be-
tween metaphorization and visualization, however, a further step is neces-
sary to clarify the logical function which the metaphor takes upon itself. In
this perspective, metaphor functions as the point of equilibrium between
two phenomena: on the one hand, the twisting of the ‘logical habits’ of the
speakers, in other words the decision to eﬀect an act of synthesis between
a subject and a predicate that are apparently irreconcilable, as is the case
in even the most banal metaphor (for example, ‘This man is a lion’); on the
other, the possibility of controlling this twisting by means of a relation-
ship of similarity between elements, which renders the category mistake
comprehensible (‘This man has certain traits which are usually predicated
of lions’).
This synthetic operation – that Ricoeur connotes in terms of a device
for ‘reduction of the shift’ – is particularly powerful, if one considers that
it works not in subordination to an established synthesis between sub-
ject and predicate, but as an alternative and in opposition to it. Now, if
metaphor is to take this task upon itself, here much is at stake that regards
its ability to work with similarity. And to do so by means of instruments
that pull down the traditional distinction between word and image. In
other words, metaphor works if and only if it is able to render an otherwise
incomprehensible synthesis eﬀective – but this result is guaranteed only
by virtue of a linguistic device that, to paraphrase Aristotle, ‘brings before
the eyes’ an invisible relation between subject and predicate. Without this
passage through visualization, the metaphoric utterance would remain to
all eﬀects mute.
If the matter stands thus, the central place of metaphorization in our
speech habits seems to force, even beyond Ricoeur’s avowed intentions, a
profound reconsideration of his hermeneutic model: a reformulation that
issues above all from a conception in which the image plays a fundamental
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role in determining the rules for using words (for example, the rules of
predication).
2.2. Towards a Pictorial Turn
If my opening remarks were right, one might search in the ﬁeld of Visual
Culture for clues to solve the aporias posed by Ricoeur’s approach to sym-
bol. From this perspective, it is no coincidence that for W.J.T. Mitchell,
independently of Ricoeur’s premises, precisely metaphoric language is a
model for the redeﬁnition of the relationship between words and images.
Let us read then what Mitchell writes about the notion of pictorial turn:
Whatever the pictorial turn is, then, it should be clear that it is not
a return to naive mimesis, copy or correspondence theories of rep-
resentation, or a renewed metaphysics of pictorial ‘presence’: it is
rather a postlinguistic, postsemiotic rediscovery of a picture as a com-
plex interplay between visuality, apparatus, institutions, discourse, bodies,
and ﬁgurality (Mitchell, 1994, p. 16, my emphasis).
This is one of the many passages that could be cited to clarify what is
at stake in Mitchell’s discourse. A stake that clearly has to do with the
semantic diﬀerence – a diﬀerence that, unlike other languages, English
renders evident – between picture and image. It is in brief the idea that the
picture is a structure of complex signiﬁcance, that combines on the one
hand the material nature of the medium – we might say its contingency, its
being a support placed in a speciﬁc time and place – and on the other its
capacity to contain something that survives the destruction of its material
support6.
Although not exactly coextensive with this distinction, the notion of
imagetext, that I referred to at the outset, expresses the same diﬃculty.
6 “What is the diﬀerence between a picture and an image? I like to start from the
vernacular, listening to the English language, in a distinction that is untranslatable into
German: ‘you can hang a picture, but you can’t hang an image.’ The picture is a material
object, a thing you can burn or break. An image is what appears in a picture, and what
survives its destruction – in memory, in narrative, and in copies and traces in other media.
[…] Picture, then, is the image as it appears in a material support or a speciﬁc place”
(Mitchell, 2008, p. 16).
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Or, better, it states the impossibility of considering a radical separation
between the content of an image and its material side, for example in the
form of a text. When Mitchell speaks of the imagetext as of a composite,
synthetic work that combines image and text, he is referring to precisely
this diﬃculty: in so far as it is an “immaterial entity, a ghostly, fantasmatic
appearance”, the image “comes to light or comes to life (which may be the
same thing) in a material support” (Mitchell, 2008, p. 18); it has radical
need of a support which – so to speak – keeps it alive.
There are many reasons to justify the juxtaposition of Ricoeur’s ana-
lysis of metaphoric language (and its aporias) with Mitchell’s approach to
the issue of the image. But the most interesting fact is that, by  com-
pletely independent paths and from autonomous perspectives, Ricoeur
and Mitchell end up drawing two specular approaches to a single prob-
lem: that concerning the possibility (in Ricoeur’s case) or the necessity (in
Mitchell’s case) of containing, enclosing the image within the utterance
(or the text).
This is the real point upon which Ricoeur’s theory of metaphor de-
pends – and which, on Mitchell’s side, calls for a rethinking of the model
within which the western tradition has conceived the dualism of word and
image. They are two symmetrical perspectives, because in Ricoeur the
metaphor – language through images – is the condition by virtue of which
language itself can be said to be alive: such that, it is blatantly the case
that we cannot imagine coining new metaphors in Latin or Ancient Greek.
While on the contrary, for Mitchell, the material support is the condition
for the survival of the image, both in the sense of the imagetext, and in
the more general context of his theory of the picture. Nonetheless, the
hypothesis of the third Copernican revolution, that I referred to at the
outset, ﬁnds here its raison d ’être. It is the idea that a revolution based on
the notion of the symbol and on its pre-eminence with regard to reﬂection
is necessary in order to include in our understanding a series of elements
that are irreducible to the acts of intentional subjectivity, and that precede
them, thus giving rise to thought. But at the same time, it is the hypothesis
that such distancing from the phenomenological model, that with Ricoeur
we can connote as a ‘second Copernican revolution’, is not yet suﬃcient to
account entirely for the way in which representations of the imagination
enrich language.
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The discovery of the symbol, beyond the boundaries of phenomenol-
ogy, is fundamental to the twentieth-century hermeneutic turn. But it
is also at the root of its intrinsic inadequacy, an inadequacy that touches
upon the impossibility of reducing the reality of extra-conceptual mean-
ings to symbolic language alone. From this point of view, the same limits
that Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of the symbol repeatedly comes up against
depend on the choice of an aporetic paradigm such as that we have re-
called paraphrasing Kant: that is on the preference for a model in which
symbolic language remains at the stage in which it is unable to ‘attain’ the
work of the imagination or to ‘make it intelligible’. But this fundamen-
tally aporetic nature of the relationship between symbolic language and
the signifying power of the image seems to be a general trait of all those
hermeneutic perspectives that are more or less directly indebted to Ri-
coeur’s model. A clear shift in the analysis then becomes necessary: a dis-
placement in which it is not only the extra-logical background of reﬂection
to come to the fore, but it is tout court the issue of the image inside language
that gives rise to thought. In this reactivation of the role of the image –
that the pictorial turn seems, unlike the linguistic turn, able to provide –
the discussion concerning the outcomes of twentieth-century philosoph-
ical hermeneutics can probably make new claims on our attention.
Translation by Hero Lotti
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